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SILVER LININGS IN FEDERAL CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM 
Carl Tobias* 
INTRODUCTION 
Many observers, including most of the participants in the 
civil litigation symposium, have levelled considerable criticism 
at the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA" or "Act") and 
its implementation. This criticism-which encompasses numer-
ous phenomena, as abstract as constitutional theory and as 
pragmatic as numerical limitations on interrogato-
ries-emanates from several quarters and ranges across the 
political spectrum. For example, one respected commentator 
has strongly argued that the statute violates constitutional 
separation of powers and predicted that the legislation will 
change civil procedure as it has existed for the last half-centu-
ry.1 Some individuals involved in federal civil litigation, includ-
ing members of the federal bench, have suggested that political 
factors substantially affected the measure's enactment.2 Nu-
merous critics believe that the statute was unnecessary or ill-
conceived because, for example, it focuses too narrowly on 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Beth Brennan and 
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton 
for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. 
Errors that remain are mine. 
1 See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 
MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, Counter-Reformation); see also 
Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and 
Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993). 
2 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call 
for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1993); Avera Cohn, A Judge's View of 
Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (1991); 
Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 Omo ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 115 (1991). At a recent Advisory Committee hearing, an attorney 
who represents defendants in products liability cases disclaimed any effort to 
speak for all such defendants. Judge Ralph Winter, a Committee member, report-
edly responded that the lawyer did not need to because Senator Eiden had already 
done so in the CJRA. 
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reducing expense and delay in civil litigation.3 Others assert 
that Congress may have failed either to think completely 
through the legislation's effectuation or to provide sufficient 
guidance for its implementation.4 
Most of these concerns have more specific manifestations. 
One is that Congress afforded minimal information on such 
critical matters as whether the ninety-four federal district 
courts could adopt local procedures that conflict with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (''Federal Rules").5 Moreover, cer-
tain of the institutions that Congress created to effectuate the 
Act, such as Advisory Groups named in each district, or to 
monitor its implementation, such as Circuit Review Commit-
tees, replicate existing entities, namely local rules committees 
and Circuit Judicial Councils, or have unclear responsibili-
ties.6 Furthermore, Congress may have structured these insti-
tutions in ways that impair their effectiveness. For instance, 
Advisory Groups consisting principally of attorneys who prac-
tice before the judges in specific districts might understandably 
be reluctant to challenge the views of those judges, while Cir-
cuit Review Committees· similarly may be reticent to criticize 
civil justice plans that their colleagues in other districts have 
prepared.7 
Some observers have criticized the federal districts' effec-
tuation of the CJRA. In a number of districts, advisory groups 
apparently have a less balanced composition than Congress 
contemplated. Certain groups are comprised substantially of 
defense counsel or interests, such as employees of large corpo-
rations, who dominated civil justice planning,8 or consist of too 
3 See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 2, at 100-04; Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Proce-
dure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. 
L. REV. 879 (1993); see also Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 1, at 392. 
• See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 2, at 100-04; Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform 
and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1402-22 
(1992). 
5 See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994); see also Mullenix, Counter-Reforma-
tion, supra note 1; see infra notes 11, 41 & 65-68 and accompanying text. 
6 See Robel, supra note 3, at 891; Tobias, supra note 4, at 1403-13; see also 
Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49 (1992). 
7 See Tobias, supra note 4, at 1403-13; see also Robel, supra note 3, at 900. 
8 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 
INDIANA, REPORT AND PROPOSED PLAN OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISO-
RY GROUP i (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter S.D. IND. REPORT]; UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
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few non-lawyers, who contributed minimally.9 In other dis-
tricts, the federal judges have apparently exercised more influ-
ence in civil justice planning than might have been appropriate 
or they were unresponsive to the reports and recommendations 
that their Advisory Groups developed. 10 Quite a few districts 
have adopted local procedures that conflict with the Federal 
Rules, and one court even declared that its provisions took 
precedence over the Federal Rules.11 
Numerous districts have prescribed procedures that may 
not reduce, and could even increase, expense and delay, there-
by inverting the expressly stated purpose of the CJRA. For 
example, all elements of the organized bar so vociferously 
opposed a pre-discovery disclosure mechanism adopted by a 
number of districts that Congress nearly refused to permit its 
national application.12 
Finally, many of the reform developments in civil litiga-
tion, especially those in the two paragraphs immediately 
above, have increased procedural disuniformity and complexity 
in the ninety-four federal districts, thus additionally fragment-
ing civil procedure.13 Indeed, the quantity and pace of recent 
reform activity have prompted calls for moratoria on the revi-
sion of Federal Rules pending an evaluation of current CJRA 
experimentation, 14 and even for a moratorium on all reform 
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING, ADVISORY GROUP REPORT AND RECOMMEND-
ED PLAN, at frontispiece (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter D. WYO. REPORT]. 
9 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, 
REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP, at frontispiece (Aug. 
1991) [hereinafter D. MONT. REPORT] (few non-lawyers); Richard L. Marcus, Of 
Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 
761 (1993) (non-lawyer quit participating). 
10 These assertions are premised on conversations with many individuals in-
volved in civil justice reform. Numerous judges did not adopt a number of their 
Groups' recommendations, and some offered no explanations. 
11 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAs, 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 9 (Dec. 20, 1991) (plan takes 
precedence) [hereinafter E.D. TEX. PLAN]; see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 1417 
(providing other examples of conflicting procedures). 
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431-36 (1993); see 
also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
13 See generally Mullenix, Counter.Reformation, supra note 1; Tobias, supra 
note 4. 
u See, e.g., Letter from Edwin J. Wesely, Chair, Advisory Group for the East-
ern District of New York, to Robert Keeton, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Feb. 3, 1992); Bry-
an J. Holzberg, Judicial Conference Approves Amendments to Civil Rules, 18 LITIG. 
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efforts.15 
Notwithstanding the numerous criticisms that observers 
have lodged at the statute and its effectuation, a number of 
which have considerable validity, the federal reform initiative 
has afforded many advantages. Unfortunately, these benefits 
have received comparatively little recognition. Because the 
reform's salutary aspects could improve the civil justice sys-
tem, they warrant analysis. This essay undertakes that effort 
by emphasizing the most important beneficial features of im-
plementation to date.16 Part I of this Article examines the ori-
gins and development of the CJRA. Part II then analyzes the 
advantageous dimensions of the reform.17 
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
ACT 
The origins and development of the CJRA warrant com-
paratively brief examination here, as they have been compre-
hensively treated elsewhere.18 Congress passed the Act out of 
growing concern about the litigation explosion, litigation 
abuse-particularly during discovery-and decreasing federal 
court access.19 Since the mid-1970s, many federal judges had 
been arguing that there was a litigation explosion and mount-
ing abuse of the litigation process.2° Congress sought to im-
NEWS 10 (Dec. 1992) (ABA Litigation Section recommendation calling for mora-
torium). 
15 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 841. 
15 I deemphasize the statute because all ninety-four districts are now imple-
menting the measure, and Congress seems unlikely to amend the legislation. See 
generally Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United:" The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Summer 1991); Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil 
Justice Reform Act, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115 (1993). 
17 I do not treat Executive Branch civil justice reform because it has received 
little implementation. See generally Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice 
Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521 (1993). 
18 See, e.g., Peck, supra note 16, at 109-12; Robel, supra note 2, at 115; Carl 
Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507, 508 (1992). 
19 See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 
S. REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6802, 6804-05. See generally Peck, supra note 16. 
20 See, e.g., National Hockey League, Inc. v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 
U.S. 639, 640 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-
41 (1975); Dissent from Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 
U.S. 997, 1000 (1980). 
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prove the federal civil justice system by encouraging reform 
"from the bottom up."21 Congress envisioned that increasing 
dialogue among federal judges and federal court practitioners 
and litigants would lead to the development of procedures that 
could reduce cost and delay and be acceptable to all partici-
pants in the reform process and in federal civil litigation. 
The statute required every one of the ninety-four federal 
districts to have issued civil justice expense and delay reduc-
tion plans by December 1993.22 The purposes of the plans are 
to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the mer-
its, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and 
ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil dis-
putes."23 The courts were to issue the plans after Advisory 
Groups tendered reports and recommendations to the dis-
tricts.24 
The statute requires these Groups, which the districts 
appointed ninety days after the CJRA's enactment, to be ''bal-
anced," including lawyers and others representative oflitigants 
who participate in civil suits in the courts.25 The Act com-
mands every Advisory Group to analyze comprehensively the 
"state of the court's civil and criminal dockets,'' to "identify 
trends in case filings and in the demands being placed on the 
court's resources" and to designate the "principal causes of cost 
and delay in civil litigation" in the district.26 The statute di-
rects each Group, in developing recommendations, to consider 
the specific circumstances and needs of the district, its parties 
and their attorneys while insuring that all three contribute 
significantly to "reducing cost and delay and thereby facilitat-
ing access to the courts."27 
The judges, after receiving the Groups' reports and sugges-
tions, considered them, conferred with the groups and then 
considered whether to prescribe the Act's eleven principles, 
guidelines and techniques and any other measures that they 
21 See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 19, at 14-16; Peck, supra note 16, at 110. 
22 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103(b)(l), 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 
II 1992). 
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. II 1992). 
2
' See id. § 472. 
25 See id. § 478(b). 
2~ See id. § 472(c)(l). 
'rl See id. § 472(c)(l)-(3). 
862 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: 857 
believed would decrease delay or cost.28 Thirty-four districts 
complied with these requirements by December 31, 1991, and 
the Judicial Conference officially designated them Early Imple-
mentation District Courts ("EIDC"),29 while the remaining six-
ty districts adopted civil justice plans between that date and 
December 1993.30 
II. BENEFICIAL AsPECTS OF FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
This Part examines the advantageous ramifications of the 
federal reform by tracing the steps that the CJRA prescribes 
for implementation. It examines the beneficial aspects of the 
courts' appointment of Advisory Groups and the Groups' efforts 
to discharge their statutory duties to assess the districts and to 
compile reports and recommendations. It also analyzes the 
districts' consideration of these reports and suggestions and 
consequent adoption of civil justice plans, various entities' 
oversight of those plans and the courts' implementation and 
evaluation of the procedures included in the plans. At each 
stage of the process, the Article affords specific examples de-
rived from experimentation in the federal districts. It then 
evaluates certain ancillary advantages of the process.31 
A. Direct Beneficial Aspects of the Planning Process 
1. Composition of Advisory Groups and Communications 
Most of the federal districts appointed Advisory Groups 
that were ''balanced," especially in terms of representation of 
28 See id. §§ 472(a), 473(a)-(b). The principles, guidelines and techniques princi-
pally govern judicial case management, discovery and ADR. 
29 See, e.g., Letter to Hon. Ralph G. Thompson, Chief Judge, United States 
District Court for the District of Oklahoma, from Robert M. Parker, Chair, Com-
mittee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States (July 30, 1992); Letter to Hon. Paul G. Hatfield, Chief 
Judge, United States District Court for the District of Montana, from Robert M. 
Parker, Chair, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States (July 30, 1992); see also Tobias, supra 
note 6, at 56 (listing EIDCs). 
30 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. II 1992). 
31 I attempt to analyze both the processes employed and the results produced. 
My analysis of the processes is premised principally on conversations with numer-
ous participants in civil justice reform. 
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various segments of the organized bar.32 For instance, numer-
ous courts included in Advisory Groups similar numbers of 
attorneys who were members of the "plaintiffs' bar" and of the 
"defense bar."33 Most districts also attempted to appoint non-
lawyers who were representative of litigants, and some tried to 
encourage considerable participation by the non-lawyers. A few 
districts balanced the number of resource-poor parties with 
individuals who represent interests that possess greater re-
sources.34 
Numerous districts instituted special efforts to foster com-
munications between the groups and local rules committees, 
which the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act required that 
courts establish to routinize and open the local revision process 
while limiting the adoption of inconsistent local procedures.35 
For example, numerous judges and Groups attempted to keep 
the committees fully apprised of their reform endeavors by 
supplying them draft reports and recommendations, holding 
joint meetings of the entities and seeking the committees' 
assistance in proposing new local procedures. Some districts 
appointed several members of their local rules committees to 
the Groups,36 while the Southern District of Indiana simply 
designated the committee as its advisory group.37 
32 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
33 See, e.g., D. MONT. REPORT, supra note 9, at frontispiece; REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN 
DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON viii (Jan. 1993). 
3
' See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY COM1llTTEE 
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY, 
App. A (Sept. 1, 1993) [hereinafter E.D. KY. REPORT]; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
GROUP FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE, 
App. A (Feb. 1, 1993). 
3~ See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2077 (Supp. II 1992). See generally Linda S. 
Mullenix, Hope Duer Experience: Mandatory Informal Discouery and the Politics of 
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 854 (1991); Tobias, supra note 4, at 1399-1401. 
36 See, e.g., D. MONT. REPORT, supra. note 9, at frontispiece; REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DIS-
TRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 
1990 AND RECOMMENDED PLAN ii (Dec. 10, 1992) [hereinafter M.D.N.C. REPORT]. 
37 See S.D. IND. REPORT, supra note 8, at i. 
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2. Advisory Group Efforts 
Practically all of the Advisory Groups undertook thorough 
analyses of conditions in their districts. The groups scrutinized 
the courts' civil and criminal dockets, delineated trends in 
filings and in demands imposed on the districts' resources, 
identified the primary sources of expense and delay in civil 
litigation and considered how these might be minimized with 
improved assessment of the legislation's effects on the 
courts.38 
Numerous Advisory Groups surveyed their bars, .inter-
viewed their judicial officers and court personnel and consulted 
other federal districts and state courts, especially within their 
own jurisdictions when designating causes of cost and delay 
and means of remedying or ameliorating them.39 In formulat-
ing suggestions, nearly every Group apparently considered the 
particular needs and circumstances of the court, its litigants 
and their counsel while guaranteeing that each contributed 
significantly to decreasing expense and delay and to facilitat-
ing court access.40 
Most of the Groups compiled thorough reports and recom-
mendations, which included all of the statutorily required 
information enumerated above and much additional instructive 
material relating to their districts' functioning. For example, 
some groups were very sensitive to issues of judicial authority, 
and the Middle District of North Carolina Advisory Group 
included a careful analysis of those questions in its report.41 
38 See, e.g., D. MONT. REPORT, supra note 9, at 17; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 8-30 (Aug. 1, 1991), reprinted in 138 F.R.D. 167, 190-212 (1991). 
39 For helpful examples of surveys, see REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII 26 (May 12, 
1993) [hereinafter D. HAW. REPORT]; M.D.N.C. REPORT, supra note 36, at 141; 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP REPORT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH 
DAKOTA, App. C (Dec. 31, 1992) [hereinafter D.S.D. REPORT]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 
472(c)(l)(C) (Supp. II 1992). 
40 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 17-19 (July 9, 1993) 
[hereinafter W.D.N.C. REPORT]; D.S.D. REPORT, supra note 39, at 44-46; see also 
28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(3) (Supp. II 1992). 
41 See M.D.N.C. REPORT, supra note 36, at 110-11; see also infra notes 65-68 
and accompanying text. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the 
Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 89, 107-10 (1993). 
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The Groups developed suggested solutions that were tai-
lored to the particular difficulties that they found. Some 
groups determined that changes were unnecessary, and recom-
mended minimal, if any, reforms. These groups found that 
their districts were experiencing little cost or delay that was 
amenable to amelioration or were already applying procedures 
that decreased expense or delay, including the congressionally 
prescribed principles, guidelines and techniques.42 But other 
Groups proposed more comprehensive change upon ascertain-
ing that their districts had encountered considerable cost or 
delay, which apparently could be reduced by procedures not 
currently in use.43 Indeed, numerous groups recommended 
that districts adopt a host of mechanisms that could decrease 
expense or delay. Some of the procedures were innovative or 
relatively untested, others were premised on identical or simi-
lar measures that had previously proved effective in limiting 
cost or delay. in other federal districts or in state courts, and 
most were based on the congressionally delineated principles, 
guidelines and techniques.44 
Illustrative of rather novel procedures was the Central 
District of California Advisory Group's suggestion that its court 
experiment assigning numerous judges only criminal cases for 
one year to expedite civil dispute resolution.45 Another Group 
recommended that its district create peer review committees of 
federal bar members to which judicial officers could submit 
discovery disputes for advice.46 A questionnaire that the East-
42 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 50-67 (Oct. 25, 1991); REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VffiGINIA 53-65 
(Sept. 19, 1991); see also D.S.D. REPORT, supra note 39, at 17. 
43 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 61-103 (Mar. 19, 1993) (herein-
after C.D. CAL. REPORT]; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSE'ITS (Oct. 1991). 
" See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. II 1992) (principles, guidelines and techniques). 
See generally Tobias, supra note 4, at 1418-22. 
45 See C.D. CAL. REPORT, supra note 43, at 65-68; cf. UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY 
GROUP REPORT 51-52 (Apr. 1993) (suggesting splitting criminal and civil dockets 
among judges). 
46 See D. MONT. REPORT, supra note 9, at 17; see also Carl Tobias, Federal 
Court Procedural Reform in Montana, 52 MONT. L. REV. 433, 449 (1991). See gen-
erally Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 MONT. L. REV. 91 
(1992). 
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ern District of California Advisory Group circulated to federal 
court practitioners indicated a valuable technique for decreas-
ing the time that lawyers spent at the court house waiting to 
argue motions: the staggered scheduling of law and motion 
matters by specially setting or scheduling at the end of the 
motion calendar lengthy proceedings.47 Several Groups urged 
that their districts adopt procedures for streamlining the dispo-
sition of summary judgment motions.48 
Some Groups premised suggestions on efficacious mea-
sures instituted in other districts or by state judges. The South 
Carolina Advisory Group drew on an expedited tracking mech-
anism employed in the Western District of Texas49 when pro-
posing that the South Carolina federal judges implement a 
similar mechanism. 50 The Group also recommended the adop-
tion of a settlement week analogous to one successfully used in 
the South Carolina state court system.51 The Connecticut Advi-
sory Group concomitantly suggested that the district create a 
joint federal-state alternative dispute resolution ("ADR'') 
scheme for providing alternatives to traditional civil litiga-
tion.52 These and related proposals for modelling federal proce-
dures on state analogues apparently represent efforts to capi-
talize on the profession's familiarity with particular procedures 
and to realize savings, for instance, by drawing on a readily 
available source of ADR providers.53 
47 See REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 81, 95, 
97 (Nov. 21, 1991); see also UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5-6 
(Dec. 31, 1991). 
48 See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 33-36 (Dec. 23, 1991); D. MONT. REPORT, supra 
note 9, at 81-83. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Western 
District of Missouri, 58 Mo. L. REV. 335, 347 (1993) .. 
49 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 6-7 (Nov. 30, 1992). 
50 See FINAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA 37-39 (July 29, 1993) [hereinafter D.S.C. RE-
PORT). 
51 Id. at 55-58; see al-so infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
52 See· REPORT AND PLAN OF CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 14-17 (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter D. CONN. REPORT). 
53 The federal and state courts often look to one another in the area of civil 
justice reform. Indeed, Congress premised a number of the eleven CJRA principles, 
guidelines and techniques on analogous state procedures. See S. REP. No. 416, 
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Practically all of the Groups called on their courts to pre-
scribe various combinations of the eleven principles, guidelines 
and techniques, especially those that involve judicial case man-
agement, discovery and ADR. Many Groups suggested some 
type of case management with ongoing judicial participation 
through management and discovery plans, conferences and 
additional mechanisms.54 
Almost every Advisory Group recommended reforms in 
discovery, a number of which were based on new Federal Rules 
amendments or the measures in the CJRA.55 For example, 
numerous Groups proposed that districts adopt automatic 
disclosure or presumptive restrictions on numbers of interroga-
tories or depositions.56 Other Groups suggested that their 
courts require litigants to certify that they had attempted to 
resolve discovery disputes before filing motions.57 
Nearly all of the Advisory Groups recommended that the 
districts experiment with multiple forms of alternatives to 
dispute resolution. These ranged across a broad spectrum from 
traditional options, such as mediation, to recently invented 
possibilities, such as court-annexed arbitration, to very new 
alternatives, namely early neutral evaluation (''ENE"), summa-
ry jury trials and settlement weeks.58 
Finally, many Advisory Groups offered a number of sug-
gestions for reducing delay and expense which were primarily 
supra note 19, at 19, 21, 23-27; see also ROBERT E. LITAN (THE BROOKINGS INSTI-
TUTION) & MARK H. GITENSTEIN (THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE), JUSTICE FOR 
ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 15-17, 29 (1989). 
~• See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIP-
PI, ADVISORY GROUP REPORT AND RECOMMENDED PLAN 1-19 (Aug. 20, 1993); 
W.D.N.C. REPORT, supra note 40, at 20-47; see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l)-(3) (Supp. 
II 1992). 
~, See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 28-34, 36-37, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431-73 
(1993); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 473(a)(3)-(5), (b)(l), (3) (Supp. II 1992). 
" See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, NORTHERN 
DISTRICT OF IOWA 8-9 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter N.D. IOWA REPORT); D. MONT. 
REPORT, supra note 9, at 73-75; see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (Supp. II 1992); 
supra note 12 and accompanying text; infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
~7 See, e.g., W.D.N.C. REPORT, supra note 40, at 44; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 68-69 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter M.D. PA. REPORT); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 473(a)(5) (Supp. II 1992). 
~g See, e.g., D. CONN. REPORT, supra note 52, at 14-16; D.S.C. REPORT, supra 
note 50, at 53-64; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 473(a)(3)(A), (a)(6), (b)(4)-(5) (Supp. II 
1992); infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
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directed to Congress. Numerous Groups recommended that the 
courts urge prompt action by the President to nominate, and 
the Senate to confirm, appointees for existing judicial vacan-
cies. 59 Similarly, many Groups suggested that Congress seri-
ously consider the impact of passing new legisla-
tion-particularly measures that create new civil causes of 
action or that federalize additional criminal behavior-on 
prompt, inexpensive civil dispute resolution.60 
3. District Courts' Consideration of Advisory Groups' 
Reports and Recommendations and the Courts' 
Adoption of Civil Justice Plans 
All of the federal districts seem to have considered careful-
ly the reports and suggestions that their Advisory Groups 
submitted. Most of the districts conferred closely with the 
Groups, and a number of courts participated in meetings with 
Group members to discuss the documents that they had devel-
oped. 61 Most districts were very responsive to the reports and 
recommendations, and some replied in writing to the sugges-
tions, explaining why the judges adopted, modified or rejected 
the proposals.62 
The benefits of this consideration and the adoption of 
plans were similar to the advantages of the Groups' efforts.63 
This certainly was true for courts that subscribed verbatim to 
their Groups' recommendations, as numerous districts did. 
More specifically, most of the courts that received modest sug-
59 See, e.g., D. HAW. REPORT, supra note 39, at 35; N.D. IOWA REPORT, supra 
note 56, at 9-10. See generally Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 
1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257. Numerous groups also recommended that the districts 
be authorized to hire additional court personnel. See, e.g., E.D. KY. REPORT, supra 
note 34, at 40-41; D.S.C. REPORT, supra note 50, at 72. 
60 See, e.g., C.D. CAL. REPORT, supra note 43, at 38-43; M.D. PA. REPORT, su-
pra note 57, at 72; see also 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(l)(D) (Supp. II 1992). 
61 I premise these ideas on conversations with numerous judges, advisory group 
members and reporters who participated in the meetings. See generally Tobias, 
supra note 16, at 118. 
62 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 
ILLINOIS, CML JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 14-17, 19-21 (Dec. 
27, 1991); UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WIS-
CONSIN, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, App. 2 (Dec. 31, 
1991) [hereinafter W.D. WIS. PLAN]. 
63 See supra notes 38-60 and accompanying text. 
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gestions for modification in turn prescribed minimal change in 
their plans.64 Even the numerous courts that adopted the rec-
ommendations only in part, however, seemed cognizant of the 
problems in civil litigation. 
Quite a few of the districts displayed sensitivity to both 
procedural and substantive issues implicating courts' authori-
ty. For instance, a number of districts did not consider those 
procedures that they included in plans to be self-executing. 
Instead, the courts made them effective only after proposing 
the promulgation of new, or the amendment of existing, local 
rules and after considering public comment. 65 Similarly, most 
districts evinced equal caution in treating substantive ques-
tions that involved authority. Numerous courts carefully at-
tempted to avoid the adoption of local procedures that conflict-
ed with the Federal Rules,66 and some districts flatly refused 
to promulgate inconsistent local procedures that Advisory 
Groups had suggested.67 Moreover, a few courts crafted proce-
dures in ways that minimized potential conflicts with constitu-
tional or statutory provisions. 68 
When engaged in civil justice planning, the judges in a 
~ See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS, 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 31, 1991); UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VmGINIA, CIVIL JUSTICE 
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 16, 1991); see also supra note 42 and 
accompanying text. 
Districts that received more comprehensive suggestions correspondingly adopt-
ed broader change. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
MAsSACHUSETTS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 18, 
1991); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
65 See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 IN THE DISTRICT OF NEW 
JERSEY 17-25 (Dec. 19, 1991); UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN 
DISTRICT OF WEST VffiGINIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 
74 (Dec. 30, 1991). 
6s See supra notes 5 & 41 and accompanying text. 
67 See, e.g., W.D. WIS. PLAN, supra note 62, App. 2, at 2, 6; cf. UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE 
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 18 (Dec. 17, 1991) (asking whether district needs 
specific power to impose compulsory, nonbinding court-annexed arbitration). 
6s For example, the Oregon District adopted co-equal case assignment involving 
Article III and magistrate judges but eschewed opt-out provisions which other 
districts employ and, therefore, may violate 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1988). See UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND 
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5, 20 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter D. OR. PLAN); see also 
infra note 70 and accompanying text. See generally Tobias, supra note 16, at 126. 
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number of districts apparently made greater efforts than previ-
ously to consider the "courts qua courts.''69 One important 
manifestation of this was the effort in some districts to treat 
the Article III judges and the magistrate judges as similar 
judicial officers for purposes of reducing expense and delay in 
civil cases. For example, several districts provided for co-equal 
assignment of civil lawsuits to Article III and magistrate judg-
es.70 Other districts correspondingly assigned cases to particu-
lar judicial officers based on the suits' subject matter or on the 
officers' specialized e}..lJertise. 71 
A small number of districts attempted to maximize proce-
dural uniformity. The preeminent example of this phenomenon 
is the intrastate uniformity that the Northern and Southern 
Districts of Mississippi attained by promulgating a joint plan 
with identical procedures.72 Other districts tried to promote a 
related type of intrastate uniformity by modelling their local 
requirements on analogous mechanisms applicable in the state 
court systems where the districts are situated.73 
Many districts prescribed numerous procedures that could 
reduce cost or delay.74 Certain of the measures were novel or 
comparatively untested, a number were based on the same or 
similar mechanisms that had decreased expense or delay in 
69 I am indebted to Donna Stienstra of the Federal Judicial Center, and John 
Oakley, the Advisory Group Reporter for the Eastern District of California, for this 
proposition. 
70 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 3-4 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter D. 
MONT. PLAN]; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 
NORTH CAROLINA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5 (Sept. 
23, 1993) [hereinafter W.D.N.C. PLAN]. 
71 See, e.g., D. OR. PLAN, supra note 68, at 23; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VmGINIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY RE-
DUCTION PLAN 4-5 (Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter W.D. VA. PLAN]; see also supra note 
43 and accompanying text. 
72 See NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN DISTRICTS OF MISSISSIPPI, CIVIL JUSTICE EX-
PENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Oct. 1993); see also Stephen N. Subrin, The 
New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648 (1981) (discussing intra-
state uniformity). 
73 See, e.g., W.D.N.C. PLAN, supra note 70, at 13-19 (premising mediation pro-
gram on state effort); Telephone Interview with Wally Edgell, Clerk, United States 
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia (Jan. 25, 1993) (premis-
ing settlement weeks on state court analogue); see also supra notes 51-52 and 
accompanying text. 
1
• Some of these were obviously identical or similar to those that groups rec-
ommended. See also supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text. 
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other districts or in the state courts, and a majority were pre-
mised on the CJRA's principles, guidelines and techniques. 
Illustrative of relatively untested procedures that were meant 
to limit litigation expenses directly was the imposition of ceil-
ings on contingency fees in the Eastern District of Texas. 75 
The Montana District's provision for co-equal assignment of 
cases to Article III and magistrate judges, which permits par-
ties to opt-out, is another measure which had received practi-
cally no prior experimentation.76 An example of federal model-
ling was the decision of the Western District of North Carolina 
to incorporate in its plan a procedure analogous to the Mon-
tana co-equal assignment system.77 An illustration of state 
borrowing was the Northern District of West Virginia's pre-
scription of settlement weeks similar to those already em-
ployed in the state court system. 78 
Virtually every district adopted some of the enumerated 
principles, guidelines and techniques, and an overwhelming 
majority prescribed procedures for case management, discovery 
and ADR. Numerous districts instituted case management 
schemes, most of which contemplated close judicial manage-
ment through judicial conferences and other techniques. For 
instance, the Maine District's plan contemplates exacting judi-
cial supervision of all cases, which are assigned to tracks by 
case-type and degree of complexity.79 
Many districts are employing a plethora of discovery re- -
forms, nearly all of which are premised on the new revisions of 
the Federal Rules or on the eleven congressionally prescribed 
procedures. For instance, most of the EIDCs and some of the 
remaining courts adopted different forms of automatic disclo-
sure. 80 Numerous districts correspondingly imposed presump-
75 See E.D. TEx. PLAN, supra note 11, at 7-8. See generally Tobias, supra note 
16, at 125. 
7a See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
77 Id. The examples in this paragraph are obviously not exhaustive. 
78 See supra note 73. 
79 See COST AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE 2-3, 
App. A (Aug. 1, 1993) [hereinafter D. ME. PLAN). Numerous other districts are 
implementing similar permutations and combinations which typically involve close 
management and tracks. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DIS-
TRICT OF NEW MExico, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE' AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 1-5 
(Jan. 1, 1993); W.D. VA. PLAN, supra note 71, at 1-2. 
so See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, 
872 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: 857 
tive numerical limitations on interrogatories or depositions,81 
although quite a few courts had prescribed these restrictions 
before Congress enacted the CJRA.82 
A substantial number of districts are experimenting with a 
broad array of alternatives to dispute resolution, including 
arbitration, mediation, ENE, settlement weeks and settlement 
conferences and summary jury trials and minitrials.83 The 
Western District of Missouri comprehensively and carefully 
initiated an early assessment program in which one-third of 
the civil cases are automatically assigned to some form of ADR 
and many of the rest are encouraged to participate.84 Several 
districts implemented or are considering settlement offer re-
quirements that resemble a proposal for amending Federal 
Rule 68, which the Advisory Committee has been evaluat-
ing.85 
4. Oversight of Civil Justice Reform 
The process for monitoring civil justice planning prescribed 
in the CJRA had several beneficial aspects.86 Some Circuit 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2-3 (Dec. 23, 1991); REPORT 
AND PLAN OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VmGIN IS-
LANDS 36-37 (Dec. 23, 1991); see also supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., D. MONT. PLAN, supra note 70, at 16; W.D. VA. PLAN, supra note 
71, at 2; see also supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
82 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
NEW YORK, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (Dec. 17, 1991) 
[hereinafter E.D.N.Y. PLAN]; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
WYOMING, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (Dec. 31, 1991); 
see also Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformi-
ty, Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2020-
26 (1989). 
83 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
NEW YORK, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 23-25 (May 14, 
1993); W.D.N.C. PLAN, supra note 70, at 13-19. 
84 See United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Early 
Assessment Program, Court-Approved General Order (Oct. 31, 1991). See generally 
Tobias, supra note 48, at 348-54. 
85 See, e.g., E.D. TEx. PLAN, supra note 11, at 10; UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF W ASlllNGTON, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND 
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, App. A (July 14, 1993); see also William W Schwarzer, 
Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 
76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992). 
86 For descriptions of the monitoring process, see Tobias, supra note 6; Tobias, 
supra note 4, at 1403-13. 
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Review Committees rigorously analyzed and made constructive 
suggestions for change in the plans that districts developed. 
For instance, the Ninth Circuit Committee scrutinized all of 
the plans that the seven EIDCs had promulgated and recom-
mended modifications in most of them.87 A few districts al-
tered their procedures in response to these suggestions, and a 
number of the remainder seriously reconsidered the mecha-
nisms questioned. 88 
The Judicial Conference Case Management Committee 
correspondingly recommended that some courts revise or reex-
amine certain features of their plans. For example, the Com-
mittee recommended that the Connecticut District implement 
several changes in the plan that it had adopted during the 
summer of 1993.89 The court decided to treat that document as 
a proposal and instituted numerous modifications which were 
responsive to the Judicial Conference's concerns.90 · 
5. Implementation With Emphasis on Annual 
Assessments 
. 
Several reasons make it difficult to offer more than prelim-
inary observations about whether civil justice reform has re-
duced expense or delay in civil litigation. A majority of the 
districts issued civil justice plans only in 1993, and many pub-
lished them as recently as November. Moreover, some of the 
EIDCs made the procedures in their plans effective as late as 
mid-1992. Furthermore, relatively few EIDCs have completed 
comprehensive annual assessments which evaluate the effec-
tiveness of their procedures in decreasing expense or delay. 
Nonetheless, some general, tentative ideas can be afforded. 
87 See REPORT OF NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW COMMITl'EE (Apr. 14, 1992). 
88 See, e.g., United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Miscella-
neous General Order No. 638, Amendment No. 1 (Apr. 27, 1992); cf. Carl Tobias, 
Ciuil Justice Planning in the Montana Federal District, 53 MONT. L. REV. 239, 244 
(1992) (discussing Montana District's reconsideration of procedures prescribed). 
89 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT, 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (June 1993); see also Tele-
phone Interview with Mark Shapiro, Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, Court Administrative Division (Dec. 1, 1993). 
90 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT, 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 1993); see also Tele-
phone Interview, supra note 89. 
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Many districts seem to have implemented civil justice 
reform carefully, and a number of courts have instituted efforts 
to inform the legal profession about their reform endeavors. 
For example, the districts have sponsored continuing legal 
education programs and have circulated to practitioners copies 
of the new procedures, often emphasizing the availability of 
particular measures, such as expedited tracks, automatic dis-
closure and ADR options.91 
Numerous mechanisms, including most of the broader 
reforms in case management, discovery and ADR that courts 
employed are apparently functioning smoothly. In fact, some 
procedures are apparently reducing cost or delay. For example, 
the division of the Montana District, which is using the opt-out 
mechanism, seems to be securing more consents to magistrate 
judge jurisdiction than the divisions that are not, thereby sav-
ing the time of Article III judges.92 Moreover, close judicial 
case management in that court and the Northern District of 
Ohio has reduced expense and delay somewhat.93 
Anecdotal evidence from several districts that have em-
ployed the controvei:sial automatic disclosure technique indi-
cates that the procedure is working rather well, particularly in 
non-complex cases once lawyers become accustomed to the 
mechanism.94 It remains unclear, however, whether the mea-
sure generally effects savings in time or money or whether it 
operates efficaciously in complex litigation. 95 
Certain ADR procedures that many districts have institut-
91 See, e.g., D. ME. PLAN, supra note 79, at 2-3 (calling for more educational 
programs); CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN AND RELATED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA (Apr. 1992) (circulating pamphlet including 
new procedures to bar). 
92 These are the preliminary results of the court's statistical analysis of the 
docket. Telephone Interview with Jeremiah Lynch, Law Clerk, Chief Judge Paul 
Hatfield (Dec. 1, 1993). 
93 Id.; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF Omo, 
ANNUAL AsSESSMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DOCKET 1 (Jan. 29, 1993) [hereinaf-
ter N.D. OHIO AsSESSMENT]; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
9
' These ideas are premised on telephone interviews with numerous practitio-
ners and other individuals familiar with automatic disclosure in the Districts of 
Arizona, Northern California, Massachusetts and Montana. 
95 See supra note 94; see also Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in 
Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 39-42 (1992); Ralph K. Winter, 
Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263, 268 (1992). 
1993) SILVER LININGS 875 
ed seem to be yielding benefits. The early assessment program 
in the Western District of Missouri has been able to increase 
the percentage of cases that are submitted to some form of 
ADR and that are settled, thus saving time and money of the 
judicial officers, attorneys and parties. 96 The plethora of possi-
bilities that the Northern District of California affords has 
apparently prompted a greater number of, and earlier, settle-
ments.97 
Some EIDCs have performed comprehensive, careful annu-
al assessments.98 The evaluation process generally helped reas-
sure a number of districts that their procedural choices to 
prescribe or eschew specific measures were reasonable. Indeed, 
the Kansas District derived valuable information from compar-
ing its results with those achieved by numerous "peer 
courts."99 Compilation of the analyses similarly enabled a few 
districts to learn that particular procedures were unworkable 
or ineffective and thus, to recalibrate them.100 
Finally, several districts capitalized on the opportunity 
that the reform's implementation provided to review and re-
vamp their local rules.101 Compliance with certain reporting 
requirements imposed by the CJRA or the districts generally 
96 See KENT SNAPP & DAVIS LOUPE, 1992 EARLY AsSESSMENT PROGRAM REPORT 
(Jan. 26, 1993); see also Tobias, supra note 48, at 352-54. 
97 Telephone Interview with Richard L. Marcus, Advisory Group Reporter, 
Northern District of California (Feb. 23, 1994); see also UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND 
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 9-17 (Dec. 1991); see also Marcus, supra note 9, at 819 
n.242. 
98 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY, 
ANNUAL AsSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 
(Dec. 1992) [hereinafter N.J. ANNUAL AsSESSMENT); N.D. Omo AsSESSMENT, supra 
note 93. 
99 See ANNUAL AsSESSMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF THE 
STATE OF THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DoCKETS AND OF THE CJRA EXPENSE AND 
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN OF THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS (July 9, 1993). 
100 See N.J. ANNUAL AsSESSMENT, supra note 98, at 20 (deleting requirement for 
preparation of joint discovery plans in non-complex cases); United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, General Order No. 92-23 Amending Article 
Four, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan (Oct. 29, 1992) (omitting 
procedure that proved unworkable); Telephone Interview with Ronald Lawson, 
Clerk, United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia 
(Jan. 20, 1993) (district undertaking fundamental revision of local rules). 
101 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 6 (1993); see Interview, supra note 
100. 
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seems to have had beneficial effects. More specifically, the 
requirements have apparently encouraged numerous judges to 
initiate special efforts that expedited the resolution of civil 
cases on their dockets. 102 
B. Ancillary Beneficial Aspects of the Planning Process 
Many somewhat less direct benefits have attended the 
process of civil justice planning. When Congress passed the 
CJRA, it probably did not foresee or consciously intend that a 
number of these specific advantages would directly result from 
the planning endeavors, although the benefits could prove to 
be among the most salutary effects of the reform effort. 
The CJRA instituted an unprecedented nation-wide self-
analysis by the federal trial courts. The districts have amassed 
a wealth of invaluable information on their functioning, insti-
tutions, personnel, procedures and local legal cultures. The 
collection, evaluation and synthesis of this material within 
specific districts among courts and nationally should increase 
immeasurably the understanding of federal civil litigation in 
the late twentieth century. 
This massive planning effort has helped to focus attention 
on the needs, problems, operations and priorities of the federal 
courts. The passage of the CJRA and its implementation have 
correspondingly promoted healthy dialogue between the federal 
judiciary and Congress. That discussion has encompassed nu-
merous facets of the civil justice system, including the optimal 
number of federal judges, the purposes of the courts, the re-
sources available for, and required to administer, the courts, 
and the importance of cooperation between Congress and the 
judiciary. Civil justice planning has also fostered valuable 
interchange between these two branches and other entities 
responsible for the courts' operation, such as the Federal Judi-
cial Center and the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts. 
102 Interviews with numerous individuals familiar with civil justice reform indi-
cate that numerous judges have employed additional personnel, moved older cases 
to the front of the queue or taken other measures to avoid the embarrassment of 
appearing to have backlogs. See generally R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting 
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases/, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 
687 (1993). 
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There has been instructive exchange among and within 
the ninety-four districts. For instance, each of the districts has 
opened and expanded communications with numerous other 
courts, especially contiguous districts or ones located in the 
same state, and with the state judiciary. The bench, bar, court 
personnel and litigants in every court have -engaged in salutary 
dialogue regarding the district. These interactions have im-
proved communications and enhanced appreciation of the fed-
eral trial courts. 
Civil justice planning has beneficially affected procedural 
experimentation, particularly relating to civil rule revision. For 
example, the experience with the 1993 federal discovery 
amendments and their integration with civil justice reforms 
implicating discovery has informed comprehension of the na-
tional rule revision process, the interface between those proce-
dures and local rule amendment and the need for federal and 
local consistency. Implementation of the CJRA has concomi-
tantly required that numerous districts adopt new, or revise 
existing, local rules. In short, these efforts have provided help-
ful insights on experimentation with the national and local 
amendment processes which Congress instituted in the 1988 
Judicial Improvements Act.103 
Finally, the testing of various mechanisms has improved 
understanding of how to experiment in ways that will promote 
the discovery and implementation of the most efficacious proce-
dures.104 Indeed, the ninety-four districts comprise highly effec-
tive laboratories of experimentation. The districts have afford-
ed the requisite diversity, in terms of geography, caseload, 
local legal cultures and procedures, to offer a valuable founda-
tion from which to extrapolate vis-a-vis numerous phenomena 
that are critical to federal civil procedure. 
Many of the developments described above ultimately 
should foster the adoption of the best procedures for treating 
modern federal civil litigation. These will involve and affect the 
institutions responsible for facilitating civil dispute resolution 
103 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (Supp. II 1992). See generally Mullenix, supra note 
35. 
10
' For valuable discussions of experimentation, see A. Leo Levin, Local Rules 
as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1991) 
and Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field 
Experiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (1988). 
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and change in civil procedure, such as Congress, the federal 
courts and the Civil Rules Committee, the specific measures, 
including Federal and local rules, and the individuals involved 
in civil suits, namely judges, attorneys and parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Civil justice reform under the CJRA has afforded a num-
ber of benefits, although some disadvantages have accompa-
nied statutory implementation. Congress, the federal judiciary, 
and federal court practitioners and litigants now must capital-
ize on the beneficial aspects of civil justice reform by promot-
ing the most effective features and by deemphasizing the least 
efficacious ones. Careful continuation of the reform initiative 
should eventually lead to the finest procedures for resolving 
civil litigation in the next century. 
